Abstract-Machine learning (ML) plays a central role in the solution of many security problems, for example enabling malicious and innocent activities to be rapidly and accurately distinguished and appropriate actions to be taken. Unfortunately, a standard assumption in ML -that the training and test data are identically distributed -is typically violated in security applications, leading to degraded algorithm performance and reduced security. Previous research has attempted to address this challenge by developing ML algorithms which are either robust to differences between training and test data or are able to predict and account for these differences. This paper adopts a different approach, developing a class of moving target (MT) defenses that are difficult for adversaries to reverse-engineer, which in turn decreases the adversaries' ability to generate training/test data differences that benefit them. We leverage the coevolutionary relationship between attackers and defenders to derive a simple, flexible MT defense strategy which is optimal or nearly optimal for a broad range of security problems. Case studies involving two distinct cyber defense applications demonstrate that the proposed MT algorithm outperforms standard static methods, offering effective defense against intelligent, adaptive adversaries.
INTRODUCTION
Machine learning (ML) methods play a central role in the solution of many security problems, including cyber defense, transportation security, counterterrorism, and crime prevention [e.g. [1] [2] [3] . For instance, ML techniques enable malicious and innocent activities to be rapidly and accurately distinguished, and appropriate actions to be taken, even when the patterns associated with these activities are buried in large, heterogeneous datasets. Roughly speaking, ML algorithms automatically learn relationships between observed variables from examples presented in the form of training data; the learned relationships are then used to generate predictions in new situations, i.e., for the test data [4] . ML's capacity to learn from examples, scale to large datasets, and adapt to new conditions make this an attractive approach to predictive analytics in general and for security informatics in particular.
Unfortunately, a standard assumption in ML -that training and test data are identically distributed -is typically violated in security applications, and this can have serious ramifications. Indeed, a defining characteristic of defense settings is that the test data are generated, in part, by adversaries whose goals conflict with the defense and who are therefore motivated to transform the test data to reduce the learner's effectiveness. The coevolving "arms race" between Spammers and Spam filters provides an illustrative example [5] . Spam filter designers attempt to learn good filters by training their algorithms on Spam (and legitimate) email messages received in the recent past. Spammers, of course, are motivated to reverse-engineer existing Spam filters and use this knowledge to generate messages which are different enough from the (inferred) training data to circumvent the filters. Many other security problems involve analogous adversarial adaptation and coevolutionary dynamics.
Recognizing this challenge, researchers have sought to develop ML-based defenses which perform well in the presence of intelligent, adaptive adversaries. Perhaps the simplest approach is to increase the robustness of the learning algorithm to generic training/test data differences via standard methods such as regularization or minimization of worst-case loss [4, [6] [7] [8] [9] . However, these techniques do not account for the adversarial nature of the training/test set discrepancies and may be overly conservative. Recently, researchers have suggested using predictive analytics in order to anticipate and counter adversary behavior [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] . For example, predictions can be made using extrapolation [10, 12, 14, 15] or game-theoretic considerations [11, 16] , and can be employed to transform training instances so that they become similar to (future) test data and therefore provide a more appropriate basis for learning [16] . This paper takes a different approach to the challenge of defending against adaptive adversaries. We formulate the defense task as one of behavior classification, in which innocent and malicious activities are to be distinguished, and assume only limited information is available regarding the adversary's objectives and prior behavior. We present a new class of ML defense strategies derived using the moving target (MT) perspective, which advises defense to adopt a time-varying posture in order to increase uncertainty concerning its operation [18] [19] [20] [21] . The proposed approach is flexible, scalable, easy to implement, and hard to reverse-engineer; the latter property reduces the ability of adversaries to make informed adjustments to their behavior and thereby circumvent the defense. We leverage the coevolutionary relationship between attackers and defenders to prove our MT defense scheduling policy is optimal or nearly optimal for a broad range of important security problems and adversary behaviors. The efficacy of the proposed approach to MT defense is evaluated through two empirical case studies involving Spam filtering and network intrusion defense. These studies demonstrate that the new MT defense substantially outperforms well-tuned "static" classifiers against adaptive adversaries, and suggest the methodology is readily implementable in a variety of domains.
II. MOVING TARGET DEFENSE

A. Problem Formulation
We formulate the task of defending against adversarial attacks as an ML classification problem, in which the goal is to distinguish innocent and malicious activity. Each instance of activity is represented as a feature vector x |F| , where entry x i of x is the value of feature i for this instance and F is the set of instance features. Behavior instances x belong to one of two classes: positive/malicious and negative/innocent (generalizing to more than two behavior classes is straightforward [4] ). A standard approach to ML-based defense is to use training data to learn a vector w |F| which enables classifier class  sign(w T x) to perform well, that is, to accurately estimate the class of each new instance x, returning 1 (1) for malicious (innocent) activities [4] .
As indicated in the Introduction, a vulnerability of classification-based defense is the fact that adversaries are frequently able to reverse-engineer the classifiers and use this knowledge to adjust their behavior and evade detection. Moving target (MT) defenses attempt to increase the difficulty of the reverseengineering task by presenting a dynamic posture to adversaries [18] [19] [20] [21] . While this idea is appealing and potentially powerful, little work has been done to specify and analyze MT defenses in a mathematically-rigorous manner or to evaluate the effectiveness of such defenses relative to good static methods.
In this paper we derive a new class of MT defenses which possess attractive theoretical properties and outperform welltuned static defenses in empirical tests. We investigate MT defense within the framework provided by repeated two-player games with incomplete information [22] . In these games one player, the informed player, has access to information that is unavailable to the other, uninformed, player. The informed player must weigh the relative benefits of exploiting her private information to achieve short-term advantage against the possibility that this exploitation may reveal information which results in the sacrifice of future gains. Because repeated incomplete information games explicitly account for the informational advantages enjoyed by defense in the MT setup, they afford a convenient setting for developing MT strategies.
A plausible way to reduce the degree to which adversaries can reverse-engineer, and then adapt to and defeat, a classifierbased defense is to introduce randomness into the way the ML features F are selected and used. One simple way to incorporate randomness is outlined in the following three steps: 1.) divide the original feature set F into K randomly-selected, possibly overlapping subsets {F 1 , …, F K }, where | F i |m  i; 2.) train one classifier for each feature subset F i , yielding a collection of K classifiers {w 1 , …, w K }; 3.) during operation, switch between the classifiers w i according to some randomized scheduling policy. In order to implement this MT defense, it is necessary to define a procedure for selecting which classifier is to be "active" at each time period. Thus a key problem in the design of such an MT defense can be stated as: given a collection of classifiers W  {w 1 , …, w K }, specify a scheduling policy for switching among the classifiers which minimizes the effectiveness of adversary adaptation.
B. Moving Target Defense Algorithm
In order to realize an MT defense of the type proposed above, it is necessary to 1.) define the set of classifiers W  {w 1 , …, w K } associated with randomly-selected feature subsets {F 1 , …, F K }, and 2.) specify a procedure for selecting which classifier is to be active at each time period. Fortunately, there exist numerous methods for solving the former problem, that is, for learning a classifier w i corresponding to a feature (sub)set F i . For example, each classifier w i could be constructed using some standard technique for robust learning [4, [6] [7] [8] [9] , or by employing a predictive scheme to obtain anticipatory capabilities [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] . Importantly, many such classifiers are easy to implement and perform well in the absence of adversary adaptation, which makes them well-suited to serve as components of an MT defense system. Thus in what follows we assume that a collection of classifiers W  {w 1 , …, w K } is available and that each w i provides accurate classification when first deployed, prior to adversary reverse-engineering, and we focus on designing a strategy for switching among the classifiers which minimizes the effectiveness of adversary adaptation.
We model the repeated, incomplete information game between our MT defense and an ecology of adversaries as a hidden mode hybrid dynamical system (HM-HDS) [23] (see Figure 1) . In this game, the adversaries attempt to maximize their payoff function U A , assumed to be of the general form:
In (1), loss: {1,1}  [0,1] is some measure of performance for defense classifier w m (e.g., misclassification rate), x is an activity instance drawn from the training data distribution and modeled using the m features corresponding to w, y {1,1} is the label of x (innocent or malicious), R:
is a regularization function (e.g. R(a)  α ||a|| 2 with α0), and a  m is the action of the adversary. Thus, in each round of the game, the adversary is modeled as attempting to circumvent the defense by transforming training data via a. More specifically, the adversary acts to increase the probability of misclassifying malicious instance x by adding a to x, subject to the need to limit the magnitude of this transformation (large a is penalized with regularizer R(.)). U A therefore captures in a simple way the fact that the actions of the attacker are always constrained by the goals of the attack. For instance, in the case of Spam, the Spammer tries to manipulate message x in such a way that it becomes similar enough to legitimate email to pass through the Spam filter, but is subject to the constraint that the transformed message xa must still communicate the desired information to the recipient (so a cannot be too "large").
The payoff function U D for the defender takes the form
so that the defender's goal is to reduce loss(.), despite the attack a, through specification of an appropriate classifier w. It will be convenient in subsequent development to denote the (nominal) effectiveness of classifier w as E  1  loss(y, w T x). Notice that the formulation (1),(2) provides a simple way to model the attacker's goal as counter to, but not exactly the opposite of, the defender's goal, and this is consistent with many real-world settings. Returning to the Spam example, the Spammer's objective of delivering messages which induce profitable user responses is not the inverse of an email service provider's goal of achieving high Spam recognition with a very low false-positive rate.
The defender and attackers thus play a repeated game with actions w and a, respectively. Additionally, the players adapt their behaviors in an attempt to improve their payoffs:
defense:
The dynamics (3) models an evolutionary game strategy on the part of the attackers, for example as realized through fictitious play, replicator dynamics, gradient play, or explicit reverse-engineering [24] . This representation is consistent with a broad range of situations, including the common circumstance in which there exists an ecology of attackers seeking to thwart the defense. The dynamics (4) captures the way the defense switches among the available classifiers W  {w 1 , …, w K }.
The dynamics (3),(4) are naturally represented as an HM-HDS, as depicted in Figure 1 . The classifier w which is active at a given point in time is the "hidden mode", known only to the defense. While not explicitly observable by the attacker, the hidden mode affects the payoff U A the attacker realizes for a given attack a. This feedback loop from defender to attacker is shown in Figure 1 and is captured in (3) by modeling the attacker dynamics with a family of vector fields {f w } indexed by w. Because the switching rule (4) can be based upon defense payoff U D , which is a function of attacker action a, there is also a feedback loop from attacker to defender (see Figure  1) . It can be seen that the interaction between MT defense and adaptive attacker is well-modeled within the HDS framework. For instance, the HDS formalism offers an expressive, analytically-tractable way to represent feedback interconnections in which the two dynamical systems evolve on continuous and discrete state spaces, respectively, which is the case here ((3) evolves on  m and (4) evolves on W). Background material on the theory of HDS and their applications may be found in [23, 25, 26] .
We make three main assumptions regarding the HM-HDS (3),(4).
1. The set of vector fields {f w } is such that if w(t)  w c , with w c constant, then a converges in finite time to the -ball B  (a*), where a* is the "best response" for U A (a, w c ) [24] and  is small enough so that payoff U A (a, w c ) is "good" aB  (a*). To be concrete, it is supposed that each attack aB  (a*) results in significant reduction of defense effectiveness: ΔE  loss(y, w T (xa))  loss(y, w T x)  E, with [ 0 ,1] and  0 1/2 (the specific value of  0 is not crucial). Note we have found this property to hold, with  0  0.8, in applications for which the data allow empirical assessment, including Spam, malware, e-commerce fraud, and phishing (see Section III for illustrative examples).
The dynamics g evolves as a discrete-time Markov chain
(MC) {W, P(U D )}, with state set W and state transition probability matrix P(U D )  [P ij (U D )] (so that in general the transition probabilities can depend upon defense payoff).
MC switching occurs at uniformly-spaced time instants t i , t i+1  t i  Δt  i, and Δt is assumed to be "fast" relative to {f w }: g switches rapidly enough so that a adapts to the average defense w =  i p i w i , where p i is the fraction of time (or probability) that defense w i is "active". Additionally, we assume that each defense wW is "good", that is, that effectiveness E(w i ) =  i   0  3/4  i, where the specific value of  0 is not crucial (recall E measures defense effectiveness in the absence of attack, i.e., when a  0). Note we have found this property to hold in applications for which the data allow assessment, including Spam, malware, fraud, and phishing (see Section III for examples).
3. For HM-HDS (3),(4), the functions f w , g satisfy at least one of the following conditions [23] : (i) the modes of the HM-HDS are weakly distinguishable, or (ii) the continuous dynamics are order preserving, or (iii) the continuous dynamics can be over-approximated with simple differential inclusions.
Observe that the first two assumptions hold in adversarial settings in which the defense would be successful in the absence of adversarial adaptation (Assumption 2) but is unsuccessful when such adaptation is present (Assumption 1). These situations are of central importance in many applications but are understudied at present, which motivates this focus. The third assumption can be shown to be mild [23] and permits us to employ a useful technical result from [23] .
We are now in a position to present our main result. Recall that the proposed MT defense strategy possesses an HM-HDS structure (see Figure 1) , with the defense switching dynamics governed by MC (4). We seek a switching rule which maximizes defense effectiveness in the presence of adversarial adaptation. Perhaps surprisingly, a very simple scheduler is optimal or nearly optimal for a broad range of adversary characteristics. Theorem MT: Suppose we are given a collection of K classifiers W  {w 1 , …, w K } associated with randomly-selected feature subsets {F 1 , …, F K }, and we wish to switch among the classifiers using an MC {W, P(U D )} in such a way that defense effectiveness is maximized (a precise definition for defense effectiveness is given below).
 If either 1 (strong adversary adaptation) or  i    i (equally effective defenses) then the optimal MC scheduler has P ij (U D )  P  1/K  i,j (i.e., at each time t i the active classifier w a is selected uniformly at random from set W).
 As the conditions 1 and  i   are relaxed the scheduler P ij (U D )  1/K remains nearly optimal.
Proof: Define FE i = 1 -loss(y, w i T (x+a l )) to be the "final effectiveness" of defense w i , where a l B  (a*) and a* is the best response for U A (a, w) (recall w =  i p i w i ). Then the final effectiveness of an MT defense which uses defense w i with probability p i is FE =  i p i FE i , because p i is the fraction of time w i is active. A Taylor series expansion shows that, to order (p 2 ), FE i = E(w i )  p i ΔE(w i ), where 1 is a constant, so the decrease in effectiveness of w i resulting from attacker adaptation is proportional to the duration of implementation of this classifier. Therefore, to order (p 2 ) and with  set to 1,
We now derive an MC scheduler {W, P(U D )} which maximizes defense effectiveness FE. Note first that, given Assumption 3 above, the development in [23] shows that such an optimal MC has constant transition probabilities, that is, P(U D ) should be specified independently of defense payoff U D . Intuitively, the alternative strategy of computing P based upon U D can reveal exploitable information to the adversary concerning the "hidden" mode w i .
For notational (and visualization) convenience in what follows we focus on the case in which there are K = 2 defenses; however, the development is identical for K  2. Denoting p 1  1  p 2  p and maximizing FE with respect to p yields the optimal value for p:
Recalling that λ = ΔE i /E i and  1 / 2 = E 1 /E 2 gives  if either λ  1 (strong adversarial adaptation) or  1   2 (equally effective defenses) then p*  1/2 and the optimal scheduling strategy is to choose the active defense uniformly at random from {w 1 , w 2 };
 as the conditions λ  1 and  1   2 are relaxed, the deviation of p* from p  1/2 is slow (see Figure 2) .  Perhaps surprisingly, the simple scheme of choosing the active w a uniformly at random from W  {w 1 , …, w K } at each update time represents the optimal or nearly optimal strategy for a broad range of attacker and defense characteristics. For instance, as can be seen from Figure 2 , if λ  1 or  1   2 then p*  1/2 is optimal, and if these conditions are simultaneously relaxed by 25 the deviation of p* from p  1/2 is less than 5. Moreover, these results hold for the general case of K classifiers (with p*  1/K). Thus each classifier w i should have an equal (or nearly equal) probability of being selected to be active, even though some may be more accurate that others. Intuitively, if classifier w* is implemented with greater frequency than the others, say because it is especially accurate, the attackers will have increased opportunity to adapt to it, rendering w* less effective than the others in the long run.
Because the above MC scheduling strategy is very simple and possesses desirable properties, we adopt it as an element of our proposed moving target defense algorithm:
Algorithm MT
1. Collect historical data {y i , x i } n i=1 which reflects past behavior of the attackers as well as past legitimate activity, where x i  |F| is the feature vector for instance i and F is the set of instance features.
2. Divide the feature set F into K randomly-selected, possibly overlapping subsets {F 1 , …, F K }, and train one classifier for each feature subset F i , yielding a collection of K classifiers W  {w 1 , …, w K }.
3. At each update time, choose the active classifier w a uniformly at random from the set W. 
III. CASE STUDIES
A. Test Procedure
The efficacy of the proposed approach to MT defense is now evaluated through two empirical case studies. In each study we first assemble labeled empirical data {y i , x i } n i=1 corresponding to the phenomena of interest and then implement a six-step test procedure: 
2. Generate a family of attacks A  {a 1 , …, a h } of increasing "strengths" by solving
for a set of decreasing regularization parameters   { 1 , …,  h } (decreasing  results in larger attacks a). In (6) the summation is over malicious instances x i , as it is assumed that attackers have no control over innocent instances. , where the entries of x are the frequencies with which the words in vocabulary F appear in the message. The resulting dataset consists of ~128,000 emails composed of ~250,000 features. The dimension of the email feature space was then reduced from ~250K to 20 through standard singular value decomposition (SVD) analysis [4] . Finally, these emails were randomly sub-sampled to create a balanced dataset of 20,000 Spam and 20,000 legitimate emails.
The six-step test procedure described in Section IIIA is now applied to the dataset of 40,000 emails summarized above. For simplicity, only K2 classifiers/feature subsets are used in this study. Feature set F is taken to be the collection of 20 features with largest singular values found in the SVD analysis [4] , and feature subsets F 1 and F 2 are constructed by randomly sampling F (with replacement) until each subset contains 10 features.
We examine a range of attack strengths by varying parameter  in the optimization (6) . The attacks are normalized by assigning an attack strength of AS1 to attacks with magnitude ||a|| equal to the largest attack observed in the (real-world) Spam dataset. In this study,  is varied to obtain the following AS values: AS  0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1.0, 1.25, 1.5 (thus attacks vary in strength from 'no attack' to attacks with magnitude 1.5 times larger than any observed in the Spam dataset). To allow a direct test of the conclusions of Theorem MT, we also implement a suboptimal MT filter constructed by favoring the more accurate of the two classifiers in the random scheduling process; specifically, the more accurate of the two filters is selected to be active with 2/3 probability (with the less accurate filter then being selected 1/3 of the time).
Sample results are displayed in Figure 3 . Each data point in the plots represents the average accuracy over ten trials (twofold cross-validation). It can be seen that the filter based upon Theorem MT (red curve) significantly outperforms the optimal static filter specified in Step 3 of Section IIIA (magenta curve). For instance, the MT defense achieves a classification accuracy of ~90% when subjected to attacks of strength AS1, compared with ~65% accuracy provided by the static filter. Moreover, this empirical study offers support for the conclusion that favoring more accurate classifiers in an MT defense can be counterproductive. As seen in Figure 3 , the filter that schedules the more accurate classifier with greater probability (blue curve) does not perform as well as the optimal MT filter, particularly when the filters are subjected to fairly strong attacks corresponding to effective adversary reverse-engineering. 
C. MT Algorithm Evaluation: Network Intrusion
Next we examine the performance of the MT defense strategy summarized in Algorithm MT for the problem of distinguishing innocent and malicious computer network activity. The empirical data used for this case study is the KDD Cup 99 dataset, a publicly-available collection of network data consisting of both normal activities and attacks of various kinds [27] . For this study we randomly selected 1000 Normal connections and 1000 denial-of-service attacks to serve as evaluation data.
The six-step test procedure described in Section IIIA is now applied to the balanced network intrusion dataset. For simplicity, only K2 classifiers/feature subsets are used in this study. Feature set F is taken to be the full set of 30 "continuous" features adopted in previous studies (see, e.g., [14] for a discussion). Feature subsets F 1 and F 2 are constructed by randomly sampling F (with replacement) until each subset contains 15 features. As in the preceding case study, we obtain a range of attack strengths by solving (6) for different values of .
Sample results are displayed in Figure 4 . Each data point in the plots represents the average accuracy over ten trials (twofold cross-validation). It can be seen that the classifier based upon Algorithm MT (blue curve) significantly outperforms the optimal static classifier (red curve). For instance, the accuracy of the MT defense system never goes below 90%, even when subjected to large attacks, while the accuracy of the static defense quickly falls to 50% as attack strength is increased (this is equivalent to random guessing, as the dataset is balanced).
Taken together, these two case studies illustrate the ease with which Algorithm MT can be applied in different domains. Results for network intrusion case study. The plot shows how classifier accuracy (vertical axis) varies with attack strength (horizontal axis) for the optimal MT defense (blue) and optimal static defense (red).
